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Abstract 
 
The theoretical literature has pointed at the importance of access to credit market in 
determining the household decisions concerning children’s activities and the reaction of 
households to adverse shocks.  In this paper we address these issues making use of a unique 
data set for Guatemala that contains information on credit rationing and shocks.  
 
We address the potential endogeneity of the variable of interest using a methodology 
based on propensity scores and we use sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of the 
estimates with respect to unobservables. 
 
The results show the importance of access to credit markets and of shocks in 
determining children’s labor supply. 
 
JEL: D1, O1 
Keywords: Child labor, education, credit rationing, shocks    
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The relationship between credit markets and child labor has been widely discussed in 
the literature. It is well known that in the absence of perfect credit markets, investment in 
human capital may be smaller than optimal. Moreover, capital markets are important to allow 
households to smooth the effect of shocks. If capital markets were perfect, households could 
insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks. Human capital accumulation would then 
depend only on the relative benefits and costs, and its path over time would not be influenced 
by shocks. But we know that capital markets are far from perfect, especially in developing 
countries, and that this is truer for insurance markets, formal or informal.  
It is important to assess to what extent capital market imperfections and the inability 
of households to “insure” themselves against risk are actually relevant for determining the 
supply of child labor.  From a theoretical point of view, changes in the labor supply and 
investment in human capital are two of the possible responses to the presence of risks and to 
exposure to shocks. However, there is no established evidence on the extent to which 
children’s labor supply is actually used as risk coping strategy and/or as a buffer against 
shocks (with the exception discussed below).  
This has important policy implications. If the role of child labor as a buffer against 
uninsured shocks is substantial, then policies aimed at reducing household risk exposure 
might have a substantial bearing on children’s labor supply. 
                                                 
*The authors: Lorenzo Guarcello, Understanding Children’s Work Project; Fabrizia Mealli, University of 
Florence and Furio Camillo Rosati, University of Rome “Tor Vergata” and Understanding Children’s Work 
Project. 
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and 





Despite the attention given in the literature to the issues of capital market 
imperfection and child labor (human capital accumulation), there is almost no evidence on 
the issue with the exception of the seminal paper of Jacoby et Skoufias (1997). 
In this paper, we exploit a unique data set for Guatemala containing information on 
access to credit markets, occurrence of several kinds of shocks and presence of insurance 
programs. The next section will briefly outline the theoretical foundations of the work, 
Section 3 illustrates the data set used and defines the variables. The econometric 
methodology adopted is described in Section 4, and the empirical results are presented in the 
Section 5.  
1.  Credit Market Imperfection and Children’s Work 
The theoretical background of the paper rests on two sets of “classical” results about 
the role of credit markets in determining human capital accumulation. 
Recent works, building on the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1976), have 
shown that borrowing constraints may represent an important source of inefficiency in the 
allocation of household resources to human capital investment (Ranjan 2001, Baland and 
Robinson 200 and Cigno, Rosati, Tzannatos 2002). If households do not have access to 
capital markets, they might be resource constrained and under invest in the human capital of 
their children. Better access to credit might, therefore, contribute to a reduction in child labor. 
In an uncertain world, perfect capital markets would allow households to base 
investment decisions, including those on human capital, only on the relative rate of returns. 
Because the completeness of capital markets allows to households  “insure” themselves from 
the expected shocks, child labor would not be influenced by negative shocks.  
Child work (as shown in a companion paper) shows a high degree of persistence, 
making transition back to school problematic. If households move children to the (internal or 
external) labor market to cope with shocks, the costs of “uninsured” shocks can therefore be 
quite high in terms of human capital accumulation. 
Determining that credit market imperfection and shocks affect the household decision 
concerning children’s labor supply would have far reaching implications in terms of policy. 
In particular, a whole set of policies aimed at promoting development of capital markets, and 




instruments to reduce child work and increase human capital accumulation. The strategic 
relevance of such policies has recently been strongly stressed by the World Bank ( Holzmann 
and  Jorgensen, 2002, and World Bank 2001); this paper aims to offer further empirical 
support to such a policy approach. 
Recent research has shown that income has a relatively small effect on the supply of 
child work (Cigno et al. 2002, Deb and Rosati 2001). Sustained income growth or large 
transfer programs would be necessary to substantially reduce child work. Moreover, it has 
been shown (Deb and Rosati, 2001) that different groups of households have very different 
propensities to invest in children’s education, even if they have very similar sets of 
observable characteristics. Both findings are coherent with a potential role of credit rationing 
and the lack of “ insurance” mechanisms, but they do not offer direct support to these 
hypotheses. The available evidence is, however, extremely scarce. Beyond the evidence 
contained in the seminal paper of Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), some results based on a cross 
section of countries (Dehejia and Gatti, 2002) indicate that credit market development does 
have an impact on child labor. A recent paper by Edmonds (2002) performs an indirect test 
of the relevance of credit constraints for child work by evaluating the effects of an expected 
changes in household income.  
In this paper we use a unique dataset on Guatemala that contains information on 
shocks, access to credit, availability of insurance mechanism. We will be able, given this 
information, to assess the relative importance of credit market, risk and policies on child 
labor and human capital accumulation. 
The theoretical basis on which our empirical estimates will rest is well known, and no 
new insight is gained by presenting a formal model. We will therefore just outline the 
reference theoretical model and refer to the literature cited above for further details. 
We assume that households maximize a utility function defined over current 
consumption and future (children’s) consumption. Parents supply inelastically labor, whose 
returns are used to finance current consumption. Children’s time can be used either to further 
increase current consumption through work, to accumulate human capital, or for leisure 
(above the minimum level physiologically required). Human capital determines children’s 




by changing the children’s labor supply
1. The presence of credit rationing restricts the budget 
set of the household and, if binding, will generate inefficiently low level of investment in 
human capital. Moreover, household income net of children contribution is not certain, but 
rather subject to shocks. If capital markets were complete, the realization of such shocks 
would not affect children’s labor supply (and consumption), as they would be insured.  
The class of models just described predicts four possible outcomes for children’s 
activities: three corner solutions and one internal solution. A child can attend school full 
time, work full time, do neither or combine work and school. The decision of the household 
concerning the activities of their children will be guided by an unobservable utility index I : 
) , , , ( S C X Z f I =  
where Z indicates set of household characteristics including household expected or 
“permanent” income net of children’s contribution, X indicates a set of proxies for the rate of 
returns to child work and for cost and returns to schooling, C indicates a set of variable 
relating to credit rationing,  access to, public or private, insurance mechanisms, and S 
indicates realized shocks.  
2.  Data Set and Variable Definitions 
Information on poverty, household conditions and other variables was collected in 
Guatemala through the 2000 Living Standards Measurement Survey (ENCOVI, 2000). The 
survey followed a probabilistic survey design, covering 7,276 households (3,852   rural and 
3,424 urban) . The survey is representative at the national and regional level as well as in 
urban and rural areas. ENCOVI included questions to elicit a unique l evel of detail (for a 
representative sample) on themes related to vulnerability. The survey included modules on 
risks and shocks; conflict, crime, and violence; social capital; and migration.  The data set for 
Guatemala is also unique in containing information on access to credit, shocks and 
insurances. As most of our attention will be devoted to such variables, we now discuss their 
exact definition and present some summary statistics. 
                                                 
1  Several variations are possible within this class of models. For example, future consumption of parent’s could 
be included, as well as fixed costs in participating to work or school etc. Nothing of substance would change in 




Credit rationing. The survey contains a set of questions related to access to credit. In 
particular, households are asked whether they have applied for credit and, in case of 
application, whether they were denied the credit. We define as “credit rationed” households 
that did not apply for credit for one of the following reasons: a) Institutions offering credit 
not available b) Does not know how to ask for credit c) Does not have the required 
characteristics d) Does not have collateral e) Interest rates too high f) Insufficient income g) 
Institutions do not give credit to household in that conditions. We also classify as credit 
rationed households that applied for, but were denied, credit (see appendix 3 for details of the 
questions). 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for credit rationed household broken down by 
level of poverty
2. About 50 per cent of the households in Guatemala are credit rationed 
according to our definition. The incidence rises with poverty, ranging from about 40 per cent 
for households above the poverty line to almost 70 per cent for extreme poor households. In 
absolute terms, lack of income, lack of collateral and household conditions are the most 
Table 1: Distribution of Households Credit Rationed by Poverty 
Reasons for not applying for Credit  Extreme Poor  Poor  Non Poor  Total 
Institutions offering credit not available  5.13  1.98  1.86  2.39 
Does not know how to ask for credit  5.92  4.78  3.05  4.2 
Does not have the required characteristics  8.28  11.34  11.02  10.76 
Does not have the collateral  12.23  12.5  8.43  10.7 
Afraid of Loosing collateral   5.13  5.53  4.58  5.06 
Interest rates to high  5.33  6.56  12.42  8.92 
Insufficient income  34.12  36.82  37.85  36.87 
Institutions do not give credit to household in that conditions  22.09  18.24  13.01  16.54 
Other reasons  1.78  2.25  7.77  4.57 
Total  100  100  100  100 
         
Credit refused following application  Extreme Poor  Poor  Non Poor  Total 
  14.43  14.47  10.71  12.28 
         
  Extreme Poor  Poor  Non Poor  Total 
Credit Rationed Households  67.84  58.65  39.78  49.41 
Source:  Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2000.  Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE) 
Guatemala 
                                                 
2 The extreme poverty line is defined as yearly cost of a “food of basket” that provides the minimum daily 
caloric requirement, estimated in Q. 1,912. The “non-extreme” poverty line (poor) is defined as the extreme 




common reasons for not applying for credit. Credit rationing through interest rate 
adjustments mainly applies to non-poor households. The rate of rejection of credit 
applications is similar for poor and non-poor households. 
Shocks. ENCOVI 2000 contains a set of questions pertaining to the occurrence of 
shocks (See Appendix 3 for details). Shocks are divided in to two broad categories: collective 
and individual (idiosyncratic). Collective shocks include events like earthquakes, floods, fires 
etc. Individual shocks include loss of employment, death, etc
3.  Households can report more 
then one shock for each group. We have, however, classified a household as being hit by a 
shock if it reported at least one shock. In the analysis we used two dummies, one for each of 
the broad categories of shocks (collective and individual). Other classifications were also 
tried, but did not change the main results. 
Table 2: Percentage of Households Surveyed Affected by Collective and Individual 
Shocks 
Individual Shock    Shock  N° Hh  Percent 
  Yes (%)  No (%)         
Yes (%)  18  12    Individual  2769  38.06 
































































Source:  Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2000.  Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE) 
Guatemala 
 
About 50 percent of households surveyed reported experiencing one or more shock in 
year 2000; of these, 12 percent reported experiencing natural or economic shocks affecting 
the community, 20 percent shocks directly affecting the family and 20 percent affecting both. 
Of the 7,276 households surveyed, 38 percent were affected by individual (idiosyncratic) 
shocks and about 30 per cent by collective shocks (see Appendix 4 for additional details). 
The most frequently reported collective shock is a general increase of prices. This 
could reflect a misperception of the economic environment or just a generic complaint about 
the cost of living. In any case, excluding this form of shock from the definition of the dummy 
variables does not change the results obtained. 
                                                 




Table 3: Percentage of Households Affected by Different Types of Collective and 
Individual Shocks 
Individual Shock  Collective Shock 
  %    % 
Loss of employment of any member  13.67  Earthquake  0.87 
Lowered income of any member  17.42  Drought  6.32 
Bankruptcy of a family business  2.55  Flood  2.33 
Illness or serious accident of a working member of the 
household 
15.64  Storms  3.28 
Death of a working member of the household  2.19  Hurricane  1.66 
Death of another member of the household  3.03  Plagues  16.69 
Abandonment by the household head  1.67  Landslides  1.41 
Fire in the house/business/property  0.27  Forest Fires  1.1 
Criminal Act  4.79  Business Closing  0.81 
Land Dispute  1.56  Massive lay offs  0.85 
Family Dispute  1.82  General increase in price  63.01 
Loss of cash or in-kind assistance  1.82  Public Protests  0.87 
Fall in prices of products in the household business  7.54  Other Covariate Shocks  0.82 
Loss of Harvest  24.95     
Other Idiosyncratic shocks  1.08     
       
Total  100  Total  100 
Source:  Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2000.  Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE) 
Guatemala 
Risk reduction and risk coping mechanisms.  The questionnaire allows us to identify 
whether an individual  has medical insurance (public or private). A dummy variable was 
created, taking value of 1 if at least one member of the household has medical insurance 
(Insurance). Information was insufficient to identify whether households belonged to an 
informal social support network. 
“Expected” expenditure.   We computed expected expenditure by regressing 
household expenditure on a set of variables (age and sex of the household head, parents’ 
education, parents’ occupation and sector of employment, urban/rural area, regional 
dummies, household structure). 
Child and household characteristics. We have employed a set of control variables to 
take into consideration individual and household characteristics.
4 The control variables 
include: the age of the child (age, age
2); a gender dummy (Female); a dummy variable taking 
                                                 
4 The rationale for the use of these variables is well known in the literature on child work, see Cigno et al, 2001 




value 1 if the child belongs to an indigenous household (Indigenous); the number of the 
household members (Hhsize); the number of children aged 0-5 in the household (numkidsy) 
and the number of school age children (numkidso); a dummy variable taking value 1 if the 
child is a girl and there are children aged 0-5 in the household (femkidsy); and a series of 
dummy variables for the education of the mother (M_) and of the father (F_).  
3.  Child Work in Guatemala 
Child work is very common in Guatemala. Some 506,000 children aged 7-14 years, 
one-fifth of total children in this age group, are engaged in work. Most are employed on the 
family farm or in petty business and are located in rural areas. Guatemala ranks third highest 
in child work prevalence of the 14 Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries where data 
are available, behind only Bolivia and Ecuador.  In terms of GDP per capita, on the other 
hand, the country ranks fifth lowest of the 14 countries. Guatemala’s relative level of child 
work is therefore high compared to its relative level of income. 
The decision to consider the age range 7 to 14 in order to define child work is based 
on several grounds. School starts at 7 in Guatemala and no significant amount of child labor 
is found below the age of  7.  The basic cycle of education (ciclo basico) requires in most 
cases 9 years of study to be completed. It should be noted, on the other hand, that current 
legislation allow children to work legally as from the age of 14. We decided, however, to 
keep the age range coherent with the completion of the basic cycle of education, also to 
facilitate international comparison.  Nothing of substance changes in the results if we define 
child work over the age range 7- 13. 
The f ollowing table gives more detailed information on children’s activities in 
Guatemala. It shows that a significant proportion of children – 17 percent – is reportedly 
neither working nor attending school. This group includes children (mainly girls) performing 
full time household chores, “hidden” workers and children for whom school attendance is too 
expensive or impossible due to lack of infrastructure, but that do not have opportunities to 
perform any productive activities. “Idle” children, a group almost as large as that of working 
children, also constitute an important policy concern; they not only do not go to school, but 
are at risk of becoming part of the labor force. This group is the most sensitive to changes in 




The table shows that gender differences in child activity status are important: boys are 
more likely to work, but girls are more likely to be neither working nor attending school. It 
also shows that children of indigenous households have a lower school attendance rate and a 
higher work participation rate than the rest of the population.  
Table 4: Children Aged 7-14, by Sex, Type of Activity and Residence 
Urban  Rural  Total  Sex  Activity  %  No.  %  No.  %  No. 
Work only  4.3  19,285  12.3  104,161  9.5  123,446 
Study only  73.9  334,299  53.9  455,964  60.9  790,263 
Work and study  10.1  45,587  19.7  166,924  16.4  212,511 
Total work*  64,872  32.0  271,085  25.9  335,957 




   Neither  11.8  53,308  14.1  119,329  13.3  172,637 
Work only  4.1  17,820  6.8  54,249  5.9  72,509 
Study only  74.6  323,451  58.4  464,030  64.1  787,764 
Work and study  7.6  32,764  8.3  66,386  8.1  99,546 
Total work*  11.7  50,584  15.1  120,635  14.0  172,055 




   Neither  13.8  59,770  26.5  210,491  22  270,371 
Work only  4.2  37,105  9.7  158,410  7.7  195,515 
Study only  74.2  657,750  56.1  919,994  62.4  1,577,744 
Work and study  8.8  78,351  14.2  233,310  12.3  311,661 
Total work*  13.0  115,456  23.9  391,720  20.0  507,176 




   Neither  12.8  113,078  20.1  329,820  17.5  442,898 
       *  ‘Total work’ refers to children that work only and children that work and study. 
       **       ‘Total study’ refers to children that study only and children that work and study. 
       Source: Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI) 2000. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE) 
       Guatemala 
4.  Econometric Methodology: Propensity Scores, ATT and Sensitivity Analysis 
The main econometric problem we face in estimating the effects of credit rationing, 
insurance and shocks is the potential endogeneity of these variables. To be credit rationed, to 
belong to an insurance scheme, or to be part of a social security system can all to a certain 
extent be endogenous. Even the occurrence of a shock cannot be treated as fully exogenous: 
if strong winds destroy the roof the outcome can partially depend on the way the roof was 
build. This in turn can be seen as a decision taken from the household not independently 
from those regarding children’s labor supply and school attendance.  Given the relevance of 




length in the Appendix A in order to support the approach followed here which is based on 
propensity score matching methods and regression analyisis. Given that, as shown in many 
papers, analyses involving adjustments for unobservables tend to be quite subjective and very 
sensitive to distributional and functional assumptions and usually rely on the existence of a 
valid instrument, our analysis rests on the so-called unconfoundedness assumption, similar to 
the so-called selection on observables assumption: exposure to treatment is random within 
cells defined by observed variables X. We then use propensity score (i.e. the individual 
probability of receiving the treatment given the observed covariates)  and regression methods 
to "adjust" the best possible way for all the pre-intervention covariates.  
We now discuss how the propensity score will be specified and used for analysing the 
effects of shocks, insurance and credit rationing on child labor and school attendance. 
Credit rationing, as well as shocks and insurance, is defined at the household level. A 
child is affected as long as the household to whom she belongs is also affected. This means 
that these treatment variables are assigned at the level of households, even if we want to 
analyse their effects on children. The clustered structure of the units of analysis (children) 
has some methodological implications. First of all, because the assignment is at the 
household level, assignment can be assumed ignorable (or even unconfounded) only if we 
condition on the households and their characteristics. In terms of propensity score modelling, 
the score must be defined at the household level, thus being the probability that a single 
household with a vector of characteristics, x, is credit rationed (or subject to a shock, or 
insured). In order to be consistent with the hypothesized assignment mechanism, the vector 
should also include summary characteristics of the children in each household (e.g. the 
number and age of the children). 
Once the propensity score are estimated using households as units of analysis, the 
estimated propensity score for treated and non treated households can be used to check the 
degree of overlap between the two groups in terms of the distribution of their characteristics.  
The propensity score can also be used to estimate the ATT using a matching strategy. 
Even if the outcome involves the children within the household, the outcome Y in this case 
must be defined at the household level. Summary measures of child labor or school 




appropriate. An explicit treatment of children as unit of analysis can only be appropriately 
done in a model such as the one introduced later. 
As far as the matching procedure is concerned, in the paper we use a nearest neighbor 
matching, that for each of the 
T N  treated (e.g., rationed) households looks for the nearest 
neighbor matching sets in the group of control households, defined as: 
j i
j p p i C - = min ) (  
which usually contains a single control unit (household). Denoting the number of 
controls matched with treated observation i by
C























An estimate of the variance of this estimator can be derived analytically or using 
bootstrap methods (see Becker, Ichino, 2001 for details). 
A further complication of our analysis is that we are interested in at least three 
potentially endogenous variables, namely credit rationing, insurance and the occurrence of 
shocks.  It cannot be determined from the questionnaire the order of these treatments. In 
principle we could define a treatment variable as the combination of the three, but that would 
render the propensity score based analysis, as well as the interpretation of the results, more 
complicated. We opted instead to analyse the propensity scores for each variable separately 
and derive separate estimates of their ATTs
5. Eventual interactions among these variables are 
then captured and analysed in the model specified subsequently.  
Finally, in order to test for the consequences that a violation of the hypothesis of 
unconfoundedness could have on our causal conclusion we have performed a sensitivity 
analysis. proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and extended here to a multinomial 
outcome. In particular this method allows us to assess the sensitivity of the causal effects 
with respect to assumptions about an unobserved binary covariate that is associated with both 
                                                 
5  Some preliminary testing supported our decision, as they show conditional independence of the occurrence of 




the treatments and the outcome. Details of the methodology and of the results are reported in 
Appendix 2. 
5.  Some Results 
Propensity scores have been estimated as the probability that a household with 
characteristics X is credit rationed, insured or experienced a shock, respectively. In each 
case, specification of the propensity score was achieved by checking if the balancing 
property of the estimated propensity score was satisfied
6.  The estimated propensity score 
distributions are shown  in Appendix 5. The distributions of the propensity scores for 
“treated” and “non treated” groups of households overlap to a large extent. ATT on several 
outcome variables have been derived using a nearest neighbor matching estimator and results 
appear in Tables 5 to 8. 
The results obtained are very similar to those stemming from the regression analysis 
discussed in the next section. We leave, therefore, a detailed discussion for later and provide 
a short summary here. 
Credit rationing reduces school attendance and increases, especially, the number of 
“idle” children; individual shocks significantly increase the proportion of “working” and 
“working and studying” children, while reducing the “studying only” children. Collective 
shocks have similar effects, although the effects seem to be smaller in absolute terms. 
 
Table 5: Average Treatment Effects for “Credit Rationing” 
Results from Matching Procedure using "Credit" as a Treatment Variable 
Outcome variable  N. Treated   N. Control  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Proportion of children attending School  2078  1089  -0.044  0.017  -2.655 
Proportion of children employed  2078  1089  -0.029  0.015  -1.936 
Proportion of Children working only  2078  1089  -0.001  0.01  -0.082 
Proportion of Children studying only  2078  1089  -0.016  0.018  -0.874 
Proportion of Children working and studying  2078  1089  -0.028  0.012  -2.348 
Proportion of Idle Children  2078  1089  0.045  0.014  3.286 
 
 
                                                 




Table 6: Average Treatment Effects for “Individual Shock” 
    Results from Matching Procedure using "Individual Shock" as a Treatment Variable 
Outcome variable  N. Treated N. Control  ATT  Std. Err  T 
Proportion of children attending School  1603  1011  -0.009  0.017  -0.521 
Proportion of children employed  1603  1011  0.057  0.014  3.992 
Proportion of Children working only  1603  1011  0.013  0.01  1.347 
Proportion of Children studying only  1603  1011  -0.052  0.018  -2.842 
Proportion Children working and studying  1603  1011  0.044  0.011  3.85 
Proportion of Idle Children  1603  1011  -0.004  0.014  -0.277 
 
 
Table 7: Average Treatment Effects for “Collective Shock” 
   Results from Matching Procedure using "Collective Shock" as a Treatment Variable 
Outcome variable  N. Treated  N. Control  ATT    Std. Err.  T 
Proportion of children attending School  1284  951  -0.001  0.018  -0.047 
Proportion of children employed  1284  951  0.027  0.016  1.711 
Proportion of Children working only  1284  951  -0.002  0.01  -0.181 
Proportion of Children studying only  1284  951  -0.03  0.02  -1.495 
Proportion Children working and studying  1284  951  0.029  0.013  2.248 
Proportion of Idle Children  1284  951  0.003  0.015  0.208 
 
Table 8: Average Treatment Effects for “Medical Insurance” 
Results from Matching Procedure using "Insurance" as a Treatment Variable 
Outcome variable  N. Treated N. Control  ATT  Std. Err.  T 
Proportion of children attending School  1130  743  0.026  0.019  1.365 
Proportion of children employed  1130  743  -0.055  0.017  -3.227 
Proportion of Children working only  1130  743  -0.021  0.011  -1.942 
Proportion of Children studying only  1130  743  0.059  0.022  2.745 
Proportion Children working and studying  1130  743  -0.033  0.014  -2.454 
Proportion of Idle Children  1130  743  -0.005  0.016  -0.296 
6.  The Effects of Access to Credit, Shocks and Insurance on Children’s School 
Attendance and Labor Supply: a Multinomial Logit Analysis 
As discussed in the previous section, we have computed the propensity scores relative 
to our proxies for credit rationing, insurance and for the occurrence of shocks. As shown in 
Appendix 5, the distribution of the propensity scores for “treated” and “non treated” groups 
of households overlap to a large extent, allowing us to draw causal inference from a 
regression model with reasonable confidence, i.e. we can be confident that, under the 
unconfoundedness assumption, the use of a regression model does not imply that the 




distributions for the treatment and control groups, model-based sensitivity should be very 
limited.  Moreover, as reported in details in Appendix 2, the results obtained are robust with 
respect to the sensivity analysis carried out to assess the consequences of a violation of the 
unconfoundedness assumption. This gives us more confidence in the causal interpretation of 
our results. 
We have used a multinomial logit
7 to model the household decisions concerning the 
four children’s activities we consider (namely work only, work and study, study only, neither 
work nor study).  
Table 9 presents the marginal effects
8 obtained by estimating the multinomial logit 
model (the results of the estimates are reported in Appendix 7. 
All the coefficients for individual and household level characteristics are significant and 
have the expected sign. Holding expenditure and other characteristics constant, girls are less 
likely than boys to become part of the labor force. They are more likely to attend school, but 
especially to be “idle”. This probably indicates that they are more likely than boys to be 
involved full time in household chores.    
Indigenous children are more likely to be working than other children, and the 
probability to work increases by 8 percentage points. Parents’ education (above primary 
education is the omitted category) has a negative effect on child labor and a positive effect on 
school attendance. A child belonging to those households whose father is not educated is 
about 5 percentage points more likely to work full time and 13 percentage points more likely 
to be idle than a child belonging to household with better educated father. In the case of 
Guatemala we do not observe large differences between the impact of mother and father 
education.  
                                                 
7 The multinomial logit model is even more flexible than the usual bivariate probit model, that takes account of 
the simultaneity of the decisions only through the correlation of the error terms. In fact, the covariates in the 
multinomial logit model may explicitly have a different effect on the probability of taking one of the four 
decisions. Also note that usual weakness of the conditional logit model, namely the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) property, does not apply when, as in our case, most or all the covariates are individual 
characteristics (as opposed to choice specific characteristics) and each of them has coefficients that are choice 
specific (i.e. each of them enter the underlying stochastic utilities with a different coefficient): in this case cross 
elasticities are not constant and including another alternative to the choice set does not leave the odds of the 
other alternatives unchanged.  




Table 9: Multinomial Logit Model Marginal Effects 




  dy/dx  z  dy/dx  z  dy/dx  z  dy/dx  z 
Female  -0.022  -4.02  0.036  2.13  -0.078  -7.26  0.064  4.94 
Age  -0.023  -2.48  0.178  7.09  0.094  5.51  -0.249  -13.5 
age2  0.002  4.4  -0.010  -8.6  -0.003  -3.77  0.011  12.76 
Indigenous*  0.013  3.02  -0.096  -7.19  0.065  7.07  0.018  1.8 
Hh expenditure  -0.032  -5.01  0.152  7.95  -0.035  -2.95  -0.084  -5.41 
Hhsize  -0.013  -5.89  0.052  7.99  -0.016  -3.74  -0.023  -4.61 
Numkidsy  0.009  3.59  -0.013  -1.63  0.012  2.49  -0.007  -1.12 
Numkidso  0.003  1.46  -0.018  -2.75  0.008  1.87  0.007  1.42 
Femkidsy  -0.004  -1.8  0.003  0.36  -0.009  -1.64  0.010  1.64 
M_none*  0.050  3.22  -0.155  -5.61  -0.014  -0.84  0.118  4.99 
M_primary*  0.047  2.36  -0.092  -3.14  -0.006  -0.38  0.051  2 
F_none*  0.048  3.72  -0.177  -7.13  -0.004  -0.27  0.132  5.7 
F_primary*  0.023  2.47  -0.099  -4.53  0.002  0.19  0.073  3.8 
Collective*  0.006  0.96  -0.055  -3.08  0.055  4.62  -0.005  -0.37 
Individual*  0.015  2.51  -0.051  -3  0.039  3.65  -0.002  -0.17 
Credit*  0.006  1.3  -0.066  -4.49  -0.002  -0.22  0.062  5.55 
Insurance*  -0.014  -3.38  0.037  2.66  0.039  -4.94  0.016  1.37 
Credit_Individual*  -0.006  -0.97  0.023  1.06  0.017  -1.34  0.000  0.01 
Credit_Collectivet*  -0.010  -1.54  0.081  3.91  0.037  -3.18  -0.034  -2.11 
Regional Dummies:                 
Norte*  -0.008  -0.94  0.067  2.43  0.005  -0.22  -0.054  -3.06 
Nororiente*  -0.009  -1.08  0.051  1.84  0.003  0.16  -0.045  -2.54 
Suroriente*  -0.017  -2.44  0.088  3.32  0.021  0.94  -0.092  -6.73 
Central*  0.008  0.72  0.035  1.25  0.050  2.1  -0.092  -6.66 
Surroccidente*  -0.021  -3.21  0.113  4.62  0.017  0.81  -0.108  -8.1 
Noroccidente*  -0.016  -2.08  0.106  4.15  -0.015  -0.78  -0.075  -4.47 
Peten*  -0.003  -0.32  0.080  3.06  0.003  0.12  -0.080  -5.64 
(*) For dummy variables, dy/dx is the effect of a discrete change from 0 to 1 
 
Household expenditure reduces child labor and increases full time school attendance. 
At the mean, an increase of 10 per cent in income reduces the probability of a child to work 
only or work and study of about 7 percentage points. 
The proxies for access to credit, shocks and insurance are not only significant, but 
also show strong effects on household decisions regard children’s activities; in addition the 
results are consistent with those found in the propensity score based analysis. 
Credit rationing strongly reduces school attendance:  the probability that a child 
belonging to a credit rationed household attends school is about 7 percentage points lower 
compared to non rationed household.  Children from credit rationed households are more 




indicate that credit rationing especially influences investment in the human capital of 
children. The alternative to school is not necessarily work. Credit-rationed households would 
send their children to school, if they could have access to credit. Hence, returns to education 
are at the margin higher than returns to work. If households value children leisure, or there 
are fixed costs to send children to work, in presence of low returns to child labor credit-
rationed household will keep their children idle.  
Idle children may lose twice: they do not obtain education, and they are also 
vulnerable to enter the labor force in presence of changing circumstances.  
Households affected by shocks reduces children’s full time school attendance, and 
increase child labor. Following a collective shock, children’s participation increases by 5.5 
percentage points. The largest part of these children are full time student, that start to work 
without dropping out of school. 
Individual shocks have a similar overall effect with respect to the collective shocks. 
Child labor participation for households hit by such a shock is about 5 percentage points 
higher than average.  Individual shocks, however, mainly affect children attending school 
and increase the probability of work full time (1.5 percentage points), while only marginally 
influencing idle children. About two thirds of the children that enter the labor force continue, 
however, to attend school also.  
These results highlight the fact that inability to obtain credit significantly affects 
household investment decision in human capital, rather then children’s labor force 
participation. Shocks, on the contrary, directly affect children’s labor force participation, 
most likely because of the need to compensate for unexpected loss of resources. This result 
confirms the importance of credit rationing for investment in human capital, and indicate that 
better access to credit is not necessarily a powerful instrument to facilitate removal of 
children from the labor force.  Children who do not attend school nor work are children at 
risk of becoming workers, and they may actually be in worse conditions than working 
children, as they might receive a smaller allocation of resources
9 and do not even benefit 
                                                 
9  This seems to be confirmed by data on health status (see Cigno and Rosati, 2001, and tabulation available for 




from the increase in human capital from on-the-job training that their working children may 
receive. 
Information on the availability of formal or informal insurance and “safety nets” 
mechanisms is scarce in the data set considered. As discussed above, we have utilized an 
indicator of whether any of the household members were covered by health insurance. The 
effect of this variable is far from negligible: children belonging to household where at least 
one member (usually the household head) is covered by health insurance are about 5 
percentage points less likely to work only or to work and study. Such a large effect should 
not come to a surprise if one consider that about 15 per cent of the idiosyncratic shocks are 
linked to health conditions and that other kinds of shocks can be at least in part influenced by 
health conditions.   The inference obtained from the use of this variable might be limited by 
the fact that holding an health insurance could proxy for income and education effects. 
Better-paid jobs might have attached to them such a scheme or more educated parents could 
be in a better position to evaluate the advantage of an insurance. However, the estimates are 
obtained controlling for income and parent’s education. This gives further support to the 
conclusion that we are actually capturing differential effects on household behavior due to 
insurance coverage.  
As mentioned above, credit rationing and shocks not only significantly influence 
child work and school attendance, but these effects are also relatively large. As a rough 
impression of the size of the effects of these variable, consider that in order to achieve an 
increase in school attendance equal to that due to the elimination of credit rationing, an 
income increase of 30 per cent would be required. To match the effects of eliminating the 
consequences of a negative individual shock on child work, an increase in income of about 
20 per cent would be required. Similar figures can be obtained for the other variables. 
Policies aimed at favoring access to credit markets and to providing safety nets, 
especially to poorer households, appear to be amongst the most powerful instruments for 
promoting school attendance and reducing child work. Moreover, the income equivalent 
needed to compensate for the effects of credit rationing and shocks also indicates that 
policies aimed at reducing risk are not only effective, but may prove to be also cost efficient 




7.  Conclusion 
Recently a growing attention has been paid to policies aimed at reducing the 
vulnerability of households and at promoting risk reduction strategies. The World Bank has 
developed a Social Risk Management strategy (see the works already quoted) that is  
increasingly on more incorporated in the Bank’s coming activities 
Until now the Social Risk Management approach has focused mainly, but not 
exclusively, on targeting vulnerability to poverty as defined by consumption. Obviously there 
are other dimensions of household behavior that are important from the point of view of risk 
management and vulnerability especially in an dynamic setting. Human capital investment 
and child labor are not only important dimensions of household welfare, but they also 
influence future income vulnerability and current and future health. In this paper we have 
tried to assess whether risk and vulnerability are also relevant for the set of the decisions 
concerning children’s school attendance and labor supply. In particular we have aimed to 
evaluate the effect of shocks, credit rationing and insurance on the households decisions 
concerning children’s activities. 
On the basis of a theoretical approach based on well known results relative to human 
capital investment decision and children’s labor supply, we have developed an estimation 
strategy that allow us to assess the importance of a set of risk factors. 
We have used a very rich data set from Guatemala that contains information on 
shocks, credit rationing and insurance. Because of the potential endogeneity of the variable 
of interest, we used a m ethodology based on propensity scores. The analysis of the 
distribution of propensity scores for the “treated” and “not treated” population for the 
population of interest allows us to conclude that, given the maintained hypothesis of 
unconfoundedness (selection on observables), we can safely draw causal inference from our 
estimates. The computed ATTs confirm the main results obtained through the regression 
analysis. 
The main results indicate that credit rationing is extremely important in determining 
the household’s decision to invest in the human capital of children. This variable is, however, 
less relevant in changing the household decision relative to children’s labor supply. The main 




Even if it does not directly affect children’s labor supply, credit rationing appears to be a 
very important determinant of children’s vulnerability as “idle” children are particularly at 
risk of becoming workers and often face circumstances that are even harder than those of 
working children. 
Shocks substantially alter household decisions and a negative shock substantially 
increases the probability that a child will work. Coupled with the evidence from other 
research that child labor shows a high degree of persistence, this indicates the importance 
that protection from shocks would have in reducing children’s labor supply and increasing 
human capital investment. 
Finally risk reduction schemes, proxied in our analysis by the availability of medical 
insurance also showed substantial effect on child work. 
Note that not only the above mentioned variables are all significative, but their impact 
is quite large. For example, the same reduction in children labor supply determined by the 
elimination of negative shocks could be brought about by an increase on about 40 per cent of 
the income of the concerned household. Similar orders of magnitude are obtained for the 
other variables. 
These results clearly illustrate how policies aimed at reducing the risks households 
face and at promoting better access to credit markets, can also have powerful effects  on child 
labor. Such “general” measures do not appear to be less powerful than other targeted policies 
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Empirical applications in economics often struggle with the question of how to 
accommodate (often binary) endogenous regressor(s) in a model aimed at capturing the 
relationship between the endogenous regressor(s) and an outcome variable.  
Problems of causal inference involve “what if“ statements, and thus 
counterfactual outcomes and are usually motivated by policy concerns. They can be 
“translated” into a treatment-control situation typical of the experimental framework. 
The fact that the treatment is endogenous reflects the idea that the outcomes are jointly 
determined with the treatment status or, that there are variables related to both treatment 
status and outcomes.  “Endogeneity” thus prevents the possibility of comparing 
“treated” and “non treated” individuals: no causal interpretation could be given to such a 
comparison because the two groups are different irrespective of their treatment status.  
A growing strand of applied economic literature has tried to identify causal 
effects of interventions from observational (i.e. non experimental) studies, using the 
conceptual framework of randomised experiments and the so-called potential outcomes 
approach, that allows causal questions to be translated into a statistical model
10. While it 
is possible to find some identification strategies for causal effects even in non 
experimental settings, data alone do not suffice to identify treatment effects. Suitable 
assumptions, possibly based on prior information available to the researchers, are always 
needed.  
In this paper we will use the potential outcomes approach to causal inference, 
based on the statistical work on randomized experiments by Fisher and Neyman, and 
extended by Rubin (see Holland 1986).  In recent years, many economists have accepted 
and adopted this framework
11 because of the clarity it brings to questions of causality. 
This approach defines a causal effect as the comparison of the potential 
outcomes on the same unit measured at the same time: Y(0) = the value of the outcome 
                                                 
10 See for example Angrist and Krueger, 1999; and Heckman et al., 1999 for state-of-the-art papers. 
11  See for example Bjorklund and Moffit, 1987; Pratt and Schlaifer, 1988; Heckman, 1989; Manski, 1990; 




variable Y if the unit is exposed to treatment T = 0, and Y(1) = the value of Y if exposed 
to treatment T = 1. Only one of these two potential outcomes can be observed, yet causal 
effects are defined by their comparison, e.g., Y(1)  - Y(0). Thus, causal inference 
requires developing inferences able to handle missing data. The focus of the analysis is 
usually that of estimating the average treatment effect ATT = E(Y(1) – Y(0)), or the 
average treatment effect for subpopulations of individuals defined by the value of some 
variable, most notably the subpopulation of the treated individuals ATT = E(Y(1) – Y(0) 
| T = 1). 
The assignment mechanism is a stochastic rule for assigning treatments to units 
and thereby for revealing Y(0) or Y(1) for each unit. This assignment mechanism can 
depend on other measurements, i.e. P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X). If these other measurements 
are observed values, then the assignment mechanism is ignorable; if given observed 
values involve missing values, possibly even missing Y’s, then it is non-ignorable. 
Unconfoundedness is a special case of ignorable missing mechanisms and holds when 
P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X) = P(T = 1| X) and X is fully observed. Unconfoundedness is 
similar to the so called “selection on observables” assumption (also exogeneity of 
treatment assignment), which states that the value of the regressor of interest is 
independent of potential outcomes after accounting for a set of observable 
characteristics X. This approach is equivalent to assuming that exposure to treatment is 
random within the cells defined by the variables X. Although very strong, the 
plausibility of these assumptions rely heavily on the amount and on the quality of the 
information on the individuals contained in X. 
Under unconfoundedness one can identify the average treatment effect within 
subpopulations defined by the values of X: 
E(Y(1) – Y(0)| X = x) = E(Y(1) | X = x) - E(Y(0) | X = x) = 
=  E(Y(1) | T = 1, X = x) - E(Y(0) | T = 0, X = x) 
and also the overall ATT as : 




where the outer expectation is over the distribution of X in the population. If we 
could simply divide the sample into subsamples, dependent on the exact value of the 
covariates X, we could then take the average of the within subsample estimates of the 
average treatment effects. Often the covariates are more or less continuous, so some 
smoothing techniques are in order: under unconfoundedness several estimation strategy 
can serve this purpose. One such strategy is regression modelling: usually a functional 
form for E(Y(t) | X = x) is assumed, for example a linear function in a vector of 
functions of the covariates E(Y(t) | X = x) = g(x)’ bt. Estimates of the parameters’ 
vectors  bt (t = 0, 1) are usually obtained by least squares or maximum likelihood 
methods. Causal effects are rarely estimated, especially if the model is non linear, by the 
value of some parameters, unless some restrictions are imposed on the bt .
12 
Using regression models to “adjust” or “control for” pre-intervention covariates 
while being in principle a good strategy, it has some pitfalls. For example, if there are 
many covariates, it can be difficult to find an appropriate specification. In addition, 
regression modelling obscures information on the distribution of covariates in the two 
treatment groups. In principle, one would like to compare individuals that have the same 
values for all the covariates: unless there is a substantial overlap of the covariates’ 
distributions in the two groups, with a regression model one relies heavily on model 
specification, i.e. on extrapolation, for the estimation of treatment effects.  
Therefore it is crucial to check the extent of the overlapping between the two 
distributions, and the “region of common support” for  these distributions. When the 
number of covariates is large, this task is not an easy one. An approach that can be 
followed is to reduce the problem to a one-dimensional one by using the propensity 
score, that is, the individual probability of receiving the treatment given the observed 
covariates p(X) = P(T = 1| X). In fact, under unconfoundedness the following results 
hold (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983a) 
                                                 
12  For example imposing that the treatment effect is constant, i.e. excluding the interaction terms of the 




1.  T is independent of X given the propensity score p(X) 
2.  Y(0) and Y(1) are independent of T given the propensity score 
From (1) we can see that the propensity score has the so-called balancing 
property, i.e., observations with the same value of the propensity score have the same 
distribution of observable (and possibly unobservable) characteristics independently of 
the treatment status; from (2), exposure to treatment and control is random for a given 
value of the propensity score. These two properties allow us to a) use the propensity 
score as a univariate summary of all the X, to check the overlap of the distributions of X, 
because it is enough to check the distribution of the propensity score in the two groups, 
and b) use the propensity score in the ATE (or ATT) estimation procedure as the single 
covariate that needs to be adjusted for, as adjusting for the propensity score 
automatically controls for all observed covariates (at least in large samples). In this 
paper we will use the estimated propensity score to serve purpose a) to validate the 
regression results, and purpose b) by estimating the ATT with a propensity score based 
matching algorithm.  
The analysis of the propensity score alone can be very informative because it 
reveals the extent of the overlap in the treatment and comparisons groups in terms of 
pre-intervention variables. The conclusion of this initial phase may be that treatment and 
control groups are too far apart to produce reliable estimates without heroic modelling 
assumptions. 
The propensity score itself must be estimated: if the treatment  is binary, any 
model for binary dependent variables can be used, although the balancing property 
should be used to choose the appropriate specification of the model, i.e. how the 
observed covariates enter the model. Some specification strategies are described in 
Becker and Ichino (2001) and Rubin (2002). Propensity score methods can be extended 
to include multiple treatments (Imbems, 2000; Lechner 2001). 
The assumption that the treatment assignment is ignorable, or even 
unconfounded, underlies much of the recent economic policy intervention evaluation 
strategies (Jalan, Ravallion, 2001), so that one might have the impression that 




involving adjustments for unobserved covariates, such as the Heckman’s type 
corrections (Heckman, Hotz, 1989), is that they tend to be quite subjective and very 
sensitive to distributional and functional specification. This has been shown in a series 
of theoretical and applied papers (Lalonde, 1986; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Copas and 
Li, 1997). The adjustment for unobserved variables, however, strongly relies on the 
existence of valid instruments, i.e. on variables that are correlated with T but are 
otherwise independent of the potential outcomes. If such variables exist, they can then 
be used as a source of exogenous variation to identify causal effects (Angrist, Imbens, 
1995; Angrist, et al., 1996); the validity of a variable as an instrument, i.e., the validity 
of the exclusion restrictions, cannot be directly tested. In observational studies such 
variables are usually very hard to find, although there are some exceptions (see Angrist 
and Krueger, 1999, for some examples).  
Thus,  despite the strength of the unconfoundedness assumption, that, 
nevertheless, cannot be tested, it is very hard not to use it in observational studies: it is 
then crucial to adjust the “best” possible way for all observed covariates. Propensity 
score methods can help achieve this. The issue of unobserved covariates should then be 
addressed using models for sensitivity analysis (e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983b) or 







Our analysis of the effects of credit rationing, insurance and  the occurrence of 
shocks is based on the critical assumption of unconfoundedness; as in all observational 
studies, our results might be subjects to dispute since this assumption rules out the role 
of the unobservables. In order to check how robust our causal conclusions are, we now 
apply a method for sensitivity analysis, proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
extended here to a multinomial outcome. In particular this method allow us to assess the 
sensitivity of the causal effects with respect to assumptions about an unobserved binary 
covariate that is associated both with the treatments and with the response. 
The unobservables are assumed to be summarized by a binary variable in order 
to simplify the analysis, although similar techniques could be used assuming other 
distributions for the unobservables. Note however that a Bernoulli distribution can be 
thought of as a discrete approximation to any distribution, and thus we believe that our 
distributional assumption will not severely restrict the generality of the results. 
Suppose that treatment assignment is not unconfounded given a set of observable 
variables X, i.e., 
 
P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X)  is not equal to P(T = 1| X) 
 
but unconfoundedness holds given X and an unobserved binary covariate U, that is 
 
P(T = 1|Y(0), Y(1), X, U)  is equal to P(T = 1| X, U). 
 
We can then judge the sensitivity of conclusions to certain plausible variations in 
assumptions about the association of U with T, Y(0), Y(1) and X. If such conclusions 
are relatively insensitive over a range of plausible assumptions about U, then our causal 




  Since Y(0), Y(1) and T are conditionally independent given X and U, we can 
write the joint distribution of  (Y(t), T, X, U) for t = 0, 1 as 
 
  Pr(Y(t), T, X, U) = Pr(Y(t)| X, U) Pr(T| X, U) Pr(U| X) Pr(X) 
 
where, in our analysis, we assume that 
 
  Pr(U = 0|X) = Pr(U = 0) = p 
 
  Pr(T = 0| X, U) = (1+exp (g’X + aU))
-1 
 
  Pr(Y(t) = j| X, U) = exp(b’j X+ tj T+ dtjU) (1+ Si exp(b’i X+ ti T+ dtiU))
 –1 
      j=( Working only:W, Studying only: S, Working and Studying: WS, Idle Children: I) 
 
p represents the proportion of individuals w ith U=0 in the population, and the 
distribution of U is assumed to be independent of X. This should render the sensitivity 
analysis more stringent, since, if U were associated with X, controlling for X should 
capture at least some of the effects of the unobservables. The sensitivity parameter a 
captures the effect of U on treatment receipt (e.g., credit rationing), while  the dti,‘s are 
the effects of U on the outcome. 
Given plausible but arbitrary values to the parameters p , a and dti, we estimated 
the parameters g and bj  by maximum likelihood and derived estimates of the ATT as 
follows: 
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These estimates of the ATT are comparable to the ones based on the propensity 
score based matching procedure and they are very similar to the marginal  effects 
obtained. 
 
Table 2.1 - Average Treatment Effects for “Credit Rationing” for Different 
Values of the Sensitivity Parameters 
ATT  a=0  d0W=d 1W=0 
d0S=d 1S=0 
d0WS=d 1WS=0 
















           
Working only   0.011   0.011   0.012   0.011   0.018 
Studying only  -0.049  -0.050  -0.052  -0.053  -0.060 
Working and Studying  -0.028  -0.023  -0.028  -0.028  -0.031 
Idle Children   0.066   0.062   0.067   0.070   0.073 
 
In Table 2.1 the estimates of the ATT for credit rationing and different combinations 
of values for p , a and dti are reported. The X’s are the same used in the estimation of 
the multinomial logit model and the propensity score method. As can be observed the 
results are not very sensitive to a range of plausible assumptions about U. Note that an 
a or dti  of 0.5 almost doubles the odd of receiving the treatment or the odd of a certain 
value of the outcome. In addition these values are larger than most of the coefficients of 
the estimated multinomial logit.  Setting the values of the association parameter to 
bigger numbers may change the obtained results. However, given the number of 
observed covariates already included in the models, the existence of  a residual 
unobserved covariate so highly correlated with T and Y appears implausible. Sensitivity 
of ATT estimates for individual and collective shocks as well as for insurance gave 







Questions used to define the some of the variables used in the estimation 
 
 Questions used to Define Credit Rationed Households 
What is the principal reason that no one applied for a loan? 
 
In the community no one offer loans…………………………………....1 
Do not know how to apply for a loan…………………………………...2 
They ask for too many requirements…………………………………....3 
Don't have the goods to give guarantees………………………………..4 
Fear of losing the guarantees…………………………………….……...5 
Interest rate is too high………………………………………………….6 
Prefer to work with own resources………………………………….…..7 
Do not have opportunity to invest………………………………………8 
There was no need………………………………………………………9 
Insufficient income…………………………………………………….10 
They don't give loans to people like us………………………………...11 
Other what? ……………………………………………………………12 
 






Questions used to Define the Collective and Individual Shocks 
Collective Shocks  Individual Shocks 
In the last 12 months, has the 
households been affected by any of the 











Massive lay offs ……………..…10 
General increase in price.………11 
Public Protests …………..……..12 
Other  ……………………  …....13 
In the last 12 months, has the households been affected by 




Loss of employment of any member.……….….………...1 
Lowered income of any member………………………....2 
Bankruptcy of a family business………………………....3 
Illness or serious accident of a working member of the….4 
household.………………………………………………..5 
Death of a working member of the household …………..6 
Abandonment by the household head Fire in the 
house/business/property.………………………………....7 
Criminal Act ……………………………………………..8 
Land Dispute.…………………………………………….9 
Family Dispute.…………………………………………10 
Loss of cash or in-kind assistance.……………………...11 
Fall in prices of products in the household business.…...12 
Loss of Harvest …………………………………………13 





Questions used to Define the “Health Insurance” and “Social Security” 
Variables 
Health Insurance  Social Security 
Is [NAME] affiliated or covered by : 
 
Private Health or illness insurance …..1 
IGSS …………………………………2 
IGSS and private..…………………....3 
Other, what …………………………..4 
None …………………………………5 
Do you pay a quota to social security 
(IGSS) for the work that you do as (…..)? 
 
Yes ……………………………… 1 




Detailed Descriptive Statistics on Shocks 
Table A4.1 Shocks that Resulted in a loss of Income, Inheritance or none of them 








None   Total 
  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No. 
Earthquake  20.1  4166  32.0  6625  7.4  1524  40.6  8407  100  20722 
Drought  41.2  62231  8.6  12933  6.5  9749  43.8  66118  100  151031 
Flood  29.5  16405  14.8  8240  7.7  4293  48.0  26673  100  55611 
Storms  33.4  26186  14.4  11248  3.3  2554  48.9  38310  100  78298 
Hurricane  37.1  14663  17.3  6835  9.8  3886  35.8  14179  100  39563 
Plagues  48.9  195039  7.4  29469  5.8  23077  38.0  151401  100  398986 
Landslides  33.1  11125  12.6  4237  15.3  5137  39.0  13115  100  33614 
Forest Fires  13.0  3396  12.8  3346  7.5  1960  66.8  17473  100  26175 
Business Closing  54.7  10545  2.1  409  6.8  1301  36.4  7021  100  19276 
Massive lay offs  72.9  14861  0.0  0  7.3  1485  19.8  4046  100  20392 
General increase in price  90.5  1363135  2.6  38430  2.4  36066  4.6  68490  100  1506121 
Public Protests  35.5  7401  0.6  132  1.4  289  62.5  13011  100  20833 
Other  39.3  7706  13.7  2694  11.1  2177  35.9  7029  100  19606 
Total  72.7  1736859  5.2  124598  3.9  93498  18.2  435273  100  2390228 
Note: the totals exceed the total number of households because of multiple answers 
    
Table A4.2 Shocks that Resulted in a Loss of Income, Inheritance or none of them  





Loss of Income and 
Inheritance 
None   Total 
  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No.  %  No. 
Loss of employment of any member  93.3  166753  2.18  1.9  3394  2.62  4680  100  178727 
Lowered income of any member  93.53  213037  2.18  4963  2  4545  2.3  5230  100  227775 
Bankruptcy of a family business  83.36  27794  5.11  1705  9.39  3130  2.14  713  100  33342 
Illness or serious accident of a working member of 
the household 
85.88  2.75  5620  5.41  11060  5.96  100  204548 
Death of a working member of the household  87.75  25103  0.3  86  8.5  2431  3.45  986  100  28606 
Death of another member of the household  55.02  21814  2.95  1171  1.71  679  40.32  15987  100  39651 
Abandonment by the household head  63.93  14000  0.79  172  8.55  1872  26.74  5855  100  21899 
Fire in the house/business/property  17.04  604  65.6  2325  17.35  615  0  0  100  3544 
Criminal Act  69.93  43795  10.84  6786  8.6  5386  10.64  6661  100  62628 
Land Dispute  29.56  6047  3.83  783  5.12  1048  61.5  12582  100  20460 
Family Dispute  31.65  7513  2.96  702  3.05  725  62.34  14798  100  23738 
Loss of cash or in-kind assistance  81.62  19412  0.66  156  8.62  2051  9.1  2165  100  23784 
Fall in prices of products in the household business  79.16  78046  0.65  645  16.44  16208  3.74  3691  100  98590 
Loss of Harvest  76.67  250179  8.82  28788  11.39  37182  3.12  10168  100  326317 
Other  83.54  11835  1.52  216  0.88  125  14.05  1991  100  14167 
Total  81.18  1061603  4.44  58018  6.92  90451  7.47  97704  100  1307776 






































































































































Comparison of  the Distributions of Propensity Scores for Treated and Control Groups 
 
 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Working:    1 if individual currently works, 0 otherwise 
Attending school:  1 if individual currently attends school, 0 otherwise 
Work only:    1 if individual currently works and do not attend school 
Study only:    1 if individual currently attends school and do not work 
Work and Study:  1 if individual currently works and attends school   
Neither:    1 if individual currently neither works nor  




Female:      1 if female, 0 otherwise 
Household expenditures:   logarithm of per capita household expenditure 
 
Father’s Education:        
F_None:       1 if he has no completed education, 0 otherwise 
F_Primary:                            1 if he has completed primary education, 0 otherwise      
 
Mother’s Education: 
M_None:       1 if she has no completed education, 0 otherwise 
M_ Primary:       1 if she has completed primary education, 0 otherwise    
 
Secondary or higher education is the comparison group 
 
Indigenous:      1 if a child is indigenous, 0 otherwise 
 
Shocks: 
Collective  1 if a household reported experiencing at least a collective 
shock, 0 otherwise 
Individual  1 if a household reported experiencing at least a idiosyncratic 
shock, 0 otherwise 
 
Social Risk Indicator: 
 
Insurance            1 if at least one member of the household has a medical 
insurance, 0 otherwise 
 
Credit Rationing Indicator: 
 







Results from Multinomial Logit Estimates 
 
Reference Group: Children neither Working nor Studying 
Variable  Work only  Study only  Work and Study 
  Coef.  Z  Coef.  Z  Coef.  Z 
Female  -1.03  -6.11  -0.39  -3.65  -1.20  -8.27 
Age  1.06  3.85  1.94  13.04  2.60  11.62 
age2  -0.02  -1.96  -0.09  -12.77  -0.11  -10.22 
Indigenous*  0.22  1.68  -0.26  -3.17  0.47  4.18 
Hh expenditure  -0.31  -1.5  0.78  6.29  0.23  1.34 
Hhsize  -0.19  -2.82  0.23  5.61  0.01  0.13 
Numkidsy  0.29  3.6  0.03  0.59  0.17  2.44 
Numkidso  0.03  0.5  -0.07  -1.8  0.03  0.5 
Femkidsy  -0.19  -2.4  -0.07  -1.28  -0.16  -2.19 
M_none*  0.51  1.13  -1.03  -5.36  -0.94  -3.76 
M_primary*  0.74  1.65  -0.46  -2.45  -0.39  -1.59 
F_none*  0.30  1.01  -1.07  -6.78  -0.84  -4.09 
F_primary*  0.13  0.45  -0.63  -4.14  -0.47  -2.37 
Collective*  0.18  1.01  -0.04  -0.37  0.52  3.55 
Individual*  0.40  2.25  -0.06  -0.5  0.38  2.65 
Credit*  -0.26  -1.74  -0.52  -5.63  -0.45  -3.42 
Insurance*  -0.52  -3.36  -0.05  -0.6  -0.52  -4.12 
Credit_Individual*  -0.18  -0.78  0.03  0.21  -0.18  -0.93 
Credit_Collectivet*  -0.03  -0.13  0.36  2.39  -0.16  -0.78 
Regional Dummies:             
Norte*  0.18  0.54  0.52  2.76  0.38  1.4 
Nororiente*  0.07  0.2  0.42  2.29  0.39  1.4 
Suroriente*  0.26  0.76  0.96  5.11  1.04  3.85 
Central*  1.00  3.36  0.85  4.96  1.23  4.95 
Surroccidente*  0.25  0.8  1.13  6.43  1.13  4.5 
Noroccidente*  0.10  0.3  0.75  4.09  0.46  1.73 
Peten*  0.63  1.96  0.82  4.43  0.74  2.72 
_cons  -7.19  -2.94  -13.35  -9.53  -16.10  -8.12 
 